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On Feb. 17, 1992, Jeffrey Dahmer was
sentenced to fifteen consecutive terms of
life imprisonment for killing and dismembering fifteen young men and boys. 1
Dahmer had been arrested six months
earlier, on July 22, 1991. On Jan. 13 he
pled guilty to the fifteen murder counts
against him, leaving open only the issue
of his sanity. Jury selection began two
weeks later, and the trial proper started
on Jan. 30. The jury heard two weeks of
horrifying testimony about murder,
mutilation and necrophilia; they deliberated for five hours before finding that
Dahmer was sane when he committed
these crimes.
After the verdict, a minister who had
counselled members of the victims'
families told the Chicago Tribune, "I think
this will be the beginning of a healing."

At his sentencing two days later, Dahmer
said "I take all the blame for what I
did.'. .. Your honor, it is over now. This
has never been a case of trying to get free.
I never wanted freedom ." His lawyer told
the press that no appeal was planned.
What happened after Dahmer's arrest
is of minor importance by comparison
with what he did, which is unspeakable.
Still, the criminal justice system did very
well in this case. It handled a revolting
set of crimes and a potentially explosive
trial with as much civility, compassion,
and dispatch as possible. Half a year after
the arrest, the trial was truly over, and,
let us hope, the healing did begin.
Jeffrey Dahmer was tried in Wisconsin
- one of the fourteen American states
that have no death penalty. How would
this drama play in one of the thirty-six
other states? He would certainly be
charged with capital murder, and then a
new set of horrors would begin.

•

CAPITAl
PUNISHMfNT
IN AMfRICA
At the outset, it is very unlikely that
Dahmer would plead guilty if he faced
the death penalty. He might still want to
do so, at least initially; after all, at his
sentencing Dahmer told the judge,
"Frankly, I wanted death for myself." His
lawyers, however, would feel ethically
bound to advise him against pleading
guilty to a certain death sentence. At a
minimum, they would delay entry of a
guilty plea for as long as poss~ble, to
prevent their client from taking a fatal
step that he could not undo. If necessary,
they might attempt to get the court to
declare him unfit to enter a plea on his
own behalf. In addition, if their client
were facing the electric chair (or the gas
chamber, or lethal injection), Dahmer's
lawyers would be much more concerned
about preventing him from cooperating
with the police investigation and from
confessing fully, repeatedly, and in detail
-as he did.

As soon as Dahmer was arrested in
Wisconsin, it was clear that he would
never be released. (Indeed, less than
three years later, on Nov. 28, 1994,
Dahmer was killed in prison by another
inmate.) That would be equally true if he
was charged across the border in Illinois,
or in any other death penalty state, but
the significance of that fact would be
vastly different. In Milwaukee, it meant
that the defense had no strong incentive
to delay the day of judgment, since the
only open question was which state
institution Dahmer would live and die in.
In Chicago, the issue would be how long
he would survive in state custody:
Would he live to die of natural causes or
would he be executed, and if executed,
when? In that context, Dahmer's attorneys would slow the proceedings down
as much as possible, to make sure that
they did whatever could be done in a
case in which their client's life was at
stake, and to postpone a judgment that
could only hasten his death.

The trial would be delayed by any
number of possible pre-trial motions:
to determine the present sanity of the
defendant, to declare the applicable death
penalty statute unconstitutional, to
challenge the seizure of evidence from
Dahmer's apartment, to suppress his
confessions, to challenge the composition
of the jury panel, and so on. Some of the
rulings on these motions might be
appealed before trial.
As trial approached, the defense would
probably try to obtain special procedures
to insure the impartiality of the jury:
a change of venue, special and timeconsuming procedures in jury selection,
a further long delay, and so forth.
A capital trial of Jeffrey Dahmer
(beginning perhaps a year or two after
the arrest) would be a vast event. Jury
selection alone could easily take longer
than the sanity trial that actually occurred. In addition, the state would have
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THE FINANCIAl COST OF PURSUING ACAPITAl PROSECUTION THROUGH TO EXECUTION IS HIGH.
to prove that Dahmer committed each of
fifteen cruel, disgusting murders. Dahmer
could hardly deny that he killed any of
his victims - the physical evidence was
overwhelming - but the prosecution
might not have an easy a time proving
that he killed each of them, with "malice
aforethought" and with "premeditation
and deliberation." Weeks, if not months,
would be consumed reviewing his
atrocities in detail - pictures of mutilated bodies and body parts, testimony
from pathologists and criminologists,
descriptions of how the remains were
found, evidence of bite marks and knife
wounds - all to a packed press gallery,
if not on live television. Some of this did
happen in the sanity trial that actually
took place, but not nearly as much as we
might expect in a capital case.
Along the way there would be numerous objections and arguments about
evidence and procedure, which would
fuel future appeals. Everybody involved
- the police, the prosecutors, the judge,
the defense attorneys, the city administration, perhaps the jurors, perhaps even
some of the victims or their kin - would
come in for their fair share of abuse.
At the end of the trial, Dahmer would
undoubtedly be found guilty on all or
most counts - at the cost of millions of
dollars and incalculable additional
suffering. Then his sanity would have to
be determined, as it was in real life. In
this scenario, however, that, too, would
be a much slower, more contentious, and
more expensive proceeding. Finally if (as I expect) he was found to be sane
- there would be a penalty trial, probably before the same jury. 2
The penalty proceeding in Dahmer's
actual case was short: Nine relatives of
victims spoke about their sorrow, pain,

2
3
4
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See Lockhart v McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) .
Tennessee v Payne 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1991).
See Lockhart, note 2; State v Huertas, 51 Ohio St.
3d 22, 553 N.E. 2d 1058 (1990).
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and anger, and Dahmer himself spoke
briefly. A capital penalty trial would be
very different. The victims' relatives
would be allowed to speak as they did,
but much more would ride on their
statements. 3 As a result, the defense
attorneys would have the right to crossexamine the bereaved survivors. Some of
them might not want Dahmer to be
executed; that division could surface.
(On the other hand, if some of the
victims' relatives told the jury that they
did want him to be executed, that could
be a basis for a later reversal on appeal. 4 )
In addition, the defense would
probably present testimony from psychiatrists and psychologists who would
describe Dahmer's obvious mental
pathologies in elaborate detail; the
prosecution would counter with its own
experts. Dahmer's childhood and upbringing would be scrutinized. If there is
any pain or humiliation that his parents
and relatives have in fact been spared,
they would not escape it in a capital case.
And then Dahmer would be sentenced. If he were not sentenced to
death, there would be fury, frustration,
recriminations, perhaps even violence.
If he were sentenced to die, at least the
prosecution would have achieved its goal.
But it would not be over, not nearly. In
that situation, unlike in the actual case,
Dahmer would appeal.

ACAPITAl CASE
ON REVIEW
Procedurally, the appellate review
process for a death sentence is quite
complex. First, Dahmer would be

entitled to direct review of the trial
record by the state supreme court; if he
lost, he could petition the U.S. Supreme
Court to review that appeal by a writ of
certiorari. If the Supreme Court declined
to do so, he could file a petition in a state
court (usually a state trial court) for
"collateral" or "post-conviction" review,
raising issues that could not be determined in the first round of appeals.
A typical issue at this stage is that the
defendant's trial or appellate attorneys
were ineffective - a claim that frequently cannot be addressed on the trial
record alone.
State collateral review is extremely
variable. The initial proceeding might be
over in hours, or it might take years. If
Dahmer lost again at that stage, he could
probably appeal to a state appellate court
- perhaps even to two levels of state
appellate courts - and then, again, seek
discretionary review from the U.S.
Supreme Court. Finally (if he lost at
every stage up to this point) he could
petition for federal collateral review by
filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal district court. If that
petition was denied, he could appeal to a
federal court of appeals, and then ask the
Supreme Court for certiorari review a
third time. If his third petition to the
Supreme Court was denied, Dahmer
could file new ("successive") petitions for
collateral review in state and federal
courts, and (if necessary) appeals from
the denials of these petitions. Successive
petitions are increasingly disfavored, but
they still succeed sometimes, at least
temporarily.
For the most part, any convicted
prisoner has these same appellate
options. But there are four differences in
capital cases:

BY ALL ESTIMATES. IT IS CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN THE COST OF ANON-CAPITAL MURDER CONVICTION FOLLOWED BY LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
First, traditionally, courts are more
careful in reviewing claims of error in
capital cases. There is a strong norm that
is still widely shared (except, perhaps, by
the United States Supreme Court) that a
defendant who is facing death is entitled
to a higher level of due process than one
who is merely at risk of losing time or
money.5
Second, a non-capital sentence can be
implemented before appellate review is
complete. Some convicted defendants
(Leona Helmsley, for example) are
allowed to remain free on bail pending
direct appeal, but others (Mike Tyson)
are remanded to custody; almost all
remain imprisoned during collateral
review proceedings. Many defendants
never make bail at all, and remain in
custody from arrest through the completion of their sentences. One way or
another, a sentence of imprisonment may
be over by the time the federal courts
complete their review of a habeas corpus
petition in a non-capital case; postconviction delay favors the state. By
contrast, appellate review of any sort is
impossible after a prisoner is executed the case is moot - so death sentences
must be stayed during both collateral and
direct appeals.
Third, non-capital defendants have
limited access to lawyers. Every defendant has the right to an appointed
attorney on direct appeal,6 but there is no
such right for collateral review,7 and very
few prisoners can afford to hire lawyers.
Prisoners with death sentences, however,
are almost always represented by attorneys throughout this process, frequently
by first-rate volunteer lawyers.
Fourth, capital trials and the appeals
that follow are typically far longer and
more complex than those in other cases,

even non-capital murder trials.
If Dahmer's capital trial followed the
course I have described, it might take one
to three years simply to complete the
record for the first appeal. After that, the
process of reading the record and writing
the briefs might take another six months
to a year, perhaps longer. After the case is
briefed, the state supreme court would
schedule oral argument. This might entail
another six- or twelve- or twenty-month
delay, depending on the backlog of other
capital and non-capital cases. Eventually,
the court would hear the arguments and
reach a decision - after another lengthy
delay during which the judges and their
staff digest the small mountain of paper
such a case generates, analyze and decide
the issues, and come to terms with their
own feelings about this horror. They
could reverse Dahmer's murder convictions (or some of them), or they could
affirm the convictions and reverse the
sentence. Karima Wicks, former research
director of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund's Death Penalty
Project, estimates that perhaps half of all
death sentences or the underlying
convictions are reversed on initial appeal
- a far higher reversal rate than in other
criminal cases. Dahmer's appeal could
present excellent grounds for reversal;
in a case as complex and messy as this
one would be, there is plenty of room
for misconduct, unfairness, and error.
Nonetheless, I expect that his death
sentence, like those of most serial
murderers, would be affirmed.
If the death sentence were affirmed at
this initial review (perhaps four years or
longer after the verdict), the process
would continue. In general, the likelihood of success diminishes at each
successive stage of defense that follows

'

One of the classic statements of this position is
by justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment in
Reid v Covert, 345 U.S. 1, 77 (1956): "I do not
concede that whatever process is 'due' and
offender faced with a fine or prison sentence
necessarily satisfies the requirements of the
constitution in a capital case. The distinction is

direct review, but the chance of winning
something somewhere in the multi-step
process is still substantial. Equally important, each stage takes time. If there is a
reversal at any point, the case is sent back
to an earlier point in the process - for a
habeas corpus hearing by the federal
district court, for a redetermination of an
issue on appeal by the state supreme
court, for a new penalty trial in the state
trial court, etc. - and restarts from that
point. Any time this happens, the state has
to decide whether to throw in the towel
and settle for a life sentence, or start up
the hill again. In "ordinary" capital cases,
the prosecutors frequently decide to give
up the quest after an appellate setback. In
Dahmer's case, the prosecution would
probably never give up, in part because
every visible event would produce a new
wave of publicity, new anger, new recriminations - and renewed suffering for
the survivors of all the victims.

NO

END IN Sl6HT

How would it end? Perhaps after five or
ten years Dahmer would have his death
sentence reversed and reduced to life
imprisonment. This is the same sentence he
in fact received, but it would not carry the
same meaning; it would cause an explosion
of pain and anger. Many who were sa.tisfied
when he was sentenced to the maximum
penalty - life - would be furious that he
received only life when death was possible.
They would feel devalued, humiliated,
cheated- and it's easy to understand why,
considering the enormous costs of achieving
this outcome, and comparing Dahmer's
crimes to those of other murderers who are
occasionally put to death.

6
7

by no means novel ... nor is it neglible, being
literally that between life and death." See also,
for example, Woodson v N. Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 305 (plurality opinion) (1976) .
Douglas v California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Murray v Giarrtano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
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APERSONAl ACT OF VENGEANCE. PROPERlY EXECUTED. IS TIMElY. PASSIONATE. AND PERSONAL
On the other hand, Dahmer might
someday be executed. That possibility,
presumably, is the only justification for
this entire process. Perhaps his death
would afford some satisfaction to the
relatives of his victims, but could that
satisfaction possibly make up for the
years of gratuitous agony they would
have endured? What they really want is
an end. On April 21, 1992, Robert Alton
Harris became the first person to be
executed in California in twenty-five
years. The day before the execution, a
CNN television news report on the
mother of one of the victims stated that
"[her] grief began nearly fourteen years
ago when her son Michael and his friend
John Mayeski were killed by Robert Alton
Harris. Over the years her pain has
gotten worse instead of better, as Harris'
execution dates came and went."
The report quotes the mother as saying:
"It's time that this particular case came to
an end. It's been inhumane and terrible
anguish for the family members, and we
want peace."
And when would this final act take
place? There is no saying. As of September 1992, the average stay on death row
for all prisoners executed since 1976 is
eight years and five months; for those
executed since 1989 it is more than ten
years, and many are on death row for
crimes that took place twelve years ago,
or longer, and yet they have no execution
dates in sight. 8 Probably, most death row
inmates will never be executed. There is
no plausible way to estimate the likely
delay for a defendant who is sentenced to
death in 1992 and who is among the
minority of such defendants who are
destined for execution. The best description is that he will remain in limbo and
his case will remain open indefinitely.

8
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These calculations are based on NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Death Row
U.S.A., Spring 1993, and additional data
provided by courtesy of Ms. Karima Wicks,
research director of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund's Capital Punishment Project. The averages
given exclude "voluntary executions" - cases in
which a prisoner was executed after waiving an
available avenue of review.
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THE HUMAN
AND FINANCIAL COSTS
Obviously, Jeffrey Dahmer is not
typical of homicide defendants, and his
trial would not be typical of capital trials.
Most capital cases are simpler, cheaper,
and less promiscuously agonizing. The
scenario I have sketched shows what the
death penalty can do to a homicide case,
under extreme circumstances. Often
there are fewer steps to the process - or
they are less carefully executed - for
reasons that are as arbitrary and unfair as
any other aspect of the system: because
the defendant was inadequately represented, or, in the later stages of review,
not represented at all. In general, cases
that are less expensive and less excruciating than Dahmer's to begin with are
subject to the same-range of distorting
effects that I have described, but on a
smaller scale.
Although cases like Dahmer's are rare,
they are central to any discussion of
capital punishment. These are the crimes
for which there is the strongest consensus
that the punishment should be death,
and these are the defendants who are
most likely to be sentenced to death and sometimes executed. It's important
to consider the damage the death
penalty can do in those situations in
which we want it most.
The financial cost of pursuing a capital
prosecution through to execution is high;
by all estimates, it is considerably higher
than the cost of a non-capital murder
conviction followed by imprisonment for
life.9 But that expense - multiplied by
ten, or twenty, or thirty executions a year
- captures only a small fraction of the

9

M. Garey, "The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars
and Sense of the Death Penalty," 18 UC Davis Law
Review 1221-1273 (1985); R.L. Spangenberg and
E.R. Walsh, "Capital Punichment or Life
Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations," 23
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 45-58 (1989);
P.]. Cook&: D.B. Slawson, The Costs of Processing
Murder Cases in North Carolina, Terry Stanford
Institute of Public Policy, Duke University.

price of running a capital sentencing
system. For every murderer who is
executed there may be ten on death row
who will never be executed, and many
more who were convicted of capital
murder but not sentenced to death, or
tried for capital murder and convicted of
lesser offenses, or charged with capital
murder but tried or allowed to plead
guilty to less serious charges, or acquitted
entirely. There are thousands of such
cases each year, and for each one we pay
some proportion of the added costs of an
execution - less when the process is
aborted early, more the closer it approaches the ostensible goal.
Estimates of the total cost of using the
death penalty are exorbitant. In July
1988, for example, the Miami Herald
reported that since 1973 the state had
spent over $57 million on capital punishment and executed eighteen prisoners, at
a cost of over $3.2 million a piece. In
states with fewer executions, the costs
per head are necessarily higher. In 1987,
the Kansas legislature rejected the death
penalty for financial reasons. A budgetary
analysis prepared for the legislature
estimated that the added expense would
be $10 million in the first year, and at
least $50 million before the first execution took place several years down the
road.
Money provides a measure of the
magnitude of an enterprise, and in this
case the measure is startling. Still, we are
a rich country. We can afford to spend
$200 million or half a billion dollars a
year on death sentences, if we want to.
The personal and social costs of process
are not quantifiable, but they may be
harder to bear.

10

See Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the

Rehabilitative Ideal, Penal Policy and Social
Purpose, 4-8 (Yale Univ. Press: New Haven,
1981); Francis A. Allen, "Criminaljustice, Legal
Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal," 50]. of
Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci. 226 (1959).

THE DEATH PENAlTY IS NONE OF THESE THINGS.

VENGEANCE ANO
THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE
Why would anyone even consider a
death penalty regime of the sort we now
have?
There are two parts to the question.
First: Why do so many people want the
death penalty at all? Second: Having
chosen to use the death penalty, why
have we ended up with this Kafkaesque
system to implement it?
The most telling answer to the first
question is the simplest and most natural:
People want the death penalty for
revenge.
Vengeance has an ambiguous position
in our culture. In more liberal times,
many would disclaim revenge as a
justification for punishment: it seemed
too cruel, barbaric, inhumane, selfish,
pessimistic. To many, vengeance is unChristian. A liberal and civilized people
should not seek revenge but improvement, of the offender or of society.10 Even
now, in an increasingly conservative era
when revenge is regularly described as a
justification for punishment, it is renamed "retribution." The change is
telling; it removes the subject from the
description. Revenge is what the avenger
wreaks; retribution is simply what
happens to the wrong-doer.
Revenge is not the only possible
justification for capital punishment. Most
people who favor capital punishment also
believe that it deters homicide. Unlike
revenge, deterring killing is a universally
acceptable objective. 11 This would be a
powerful justification for the death
penalty, if true. But it is not, in two
senses. First (although I will not describe
the evidence in this context), there is no

11

See, e.g., P.C. Ellsworth and L. Ross, "Public
Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close
Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and
Retentionists," 29 Crime and Delinquency, 11616 (1983); and Alec Gallup and Frank Newport,
"Death Penalty Support Remains Strong, But
Most Felt Unfairly Applied," The Gallup Poll News
Service, Vol 56 No. 81, 3 Qune 6, 1991).

systematic evidence that the death
penalty for murder does deter homicide
to a greater extent than lengthy prison
terms. The best evidence suggests that it
has no effect on homicide rates, and a
few studies hint that it might increase the
number of murders.12 Second, belief in
deterrence is not the basis for the position of most proponents of capital
punishment. In one survey, for example,
when asked if they would continue to
support the death penalty if it were
proved to have no deterrent effect, twothirds or more of respondents said yes.13
I have no difficulty understanding the
desire for revenge, even deadly revenge,
especially in cases like Dahmer's - a
vicious predator who raped, tortured,
killed, and dismembered helpless
victims, some of them mere children. If a
relative of a victim did kill him, I would
feel a great deal of sxrnpathy for that
relative, and little, if any, for Dahmer.
But we do not allow relatives to avenge
their dead, not even in egregious cases,
and state-administered capital punishment is a poor vehicle for revenge. 14
A personal act of vengeance, properly
executed, is timely, passionate, and
personal - the grieving father tracking
down and killing the killer of his child.
The death penalty, in this society, is none
of these things. It is slow, passionless,
and impersonal, unreliable and rare. And
that brings us to the answer to the second
question: Why do we have the bizarre
death penalty apparatus I have described?
Part of the problem is that we feel that
we have to take great care to insure that
the death penalty is used fairly. The most
basic concern is to avoid errors. Nobody
wants a part in executing the wrong
person, or even the right person if the
judgment is marred by serious mistakes

12

R. Hood, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide
Perspective, 117-148 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989); R. Lempert, "Desert and Deterrence:
An Assement of the Moral Bases of the Case for
Capital Punishment," 79 Michigan Law Review
1776-1231 (1981); Zimring and Hawkins,
Capital Punishment and the American Agenda,
167-186 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1986); and W.j. Bowers and G.L. Pierce,

on issues of intent or sanity.
If capital punishment were restricted
to serial killers with bodies in the freezer,
the question of possible errors might not
be very troubling. Obviously Jeffrey
Dahmer (or john Gacy or Ted Bundy)
acted with malice and premeditation,
without provocation, and under no threat
of personal danger. Moreover, most
people probably don't care whether a
serial murderer is insane; they want him
killed just the same. But our death
penalty laws are not restricted to the rare,
extreme, and bizarre murders. A capital
trial is much more likely to involve an
addict who kills a checkout clerk at a
convenience store. In that context, the
jury's judgment may well tum on
uncertain and disputed evidence, or on
slippery interpretations.
There is no obvious best way to avoid
errors in criminal prosecutions. Our
American adversarial system of adjudication, for better or worse, relies heavily on
procedural devices to guarantee fairness
and accuracy. 15 An accused has no
particular right to a careful and thorough
investigation by the police. He does,
however, have rights to counsel, to
remain silent, to privacy, to an impartial
jury, to confront his accusers, to present
a defense, and so on. These rights may be
implemented by judicial action at every
stage - pre-trial, trial, post-trial, appeal,
collateral review. All this takes time, but
we can hardly deny these rights to those
defendants who stand to lose the most
simply because time (for a change) is on
their side. In the heat of the moment in
some cases we may want to drag the
culprit straight out and hang him. But
when that passion subsides we will still
believe that those the state wishes to kill
are entitled to at least the same level of

13

14
15

"Deterrence or Brutalization: What is the Effect
of Executions," 26 Crime and Delinquency, 511
(1980).
Ellsworth and Ross (cited in note 11).
Lempert, 1981, 1185-1187.
See Samuel R. Gross, "Loss of Innocence:
Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt,"
16 journal of Legal Studies, 395-453 (1987).
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TH( SYSUM DO(S PRODUC( WHAT TH( PUBLIC O(MANDS:
procedural care and due process as other
defendants - and probably more.
Factual errors are not the only problem. Through the 1980s, nearly 20,000
people were arrested for homicides
annually; of these, fewer than 2 percent
were sentenced to death. Were these 200
to 300 people really the most heinous
murderers we caught? Or were they
chosen by chance, or, worse, because of
some impermissible criteria - race,
poverty, the race of their victims, and so
forth? Walter Berns, an articulate advocate for capital punishment, has summarized the problem well: However strongly
one may favor the death penalty in
principle, its propriety in practice "depends
on our ability to restrict its use to the worst
of our criminals and to impose it in a
nondiscriminatory fashion. "16
The dangers of arbitrariness and
discrimination are not restricted to
capital punishment, but they are at their
worst in this context, for three reasons.
Infrequency. Again, if we limited the
death penalty to serial murders, we could
probably do a decent job of identifying
capital homicides and imposing death
sentences uniformly. Instead, most
death-penalty states select a small
number of capital cases from a large and
amorphous range of death-eligible
crimes. Many are at risk, but few are
condemned. As a result, every potentially
capital case is subject to a series of
discretionary choices - by the police,
the prosecutor, the judge, the juryeach of which might be based on happenstance or bias.
Salience. The death penalty is a
troubling and divisive institution. A
substantial minority (18 percent in a
1991 Gallup and Newport poll) still
oppose it in principle, and those who

16

17

W. Berns, "Defending the Death Penalty," 26
Crime and Delinquency, 511 (1980).
Witherspoon v Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968.)

favor the death penalty are divided about
when and how to use it. As a result, life
or death decisions may tum on the identity
of the prosecutor, the jurors, or the judge,
or on their reactions to peculiar, incidental
facts . For example, the most memorable
fact of Robert Alton Harris's crimes is that
after he killed his two teenage victims,
he ate the hamburgers they had bought at
Jack-in-the-Box. This incident was
mentioned repeatedly in news stories
throughout the fourteen-year life of the
case; it almost certainly influenced the jury
that sentenced him. How much does this
five-second sound bite tell us about Harris?
Would he have deserved death any less if
he had eaten lunch before he kidnapped
his hapless victims?
juries. Jury sentencing is uncommon
for non-capital crimes in the United
States, but it is the .rule in capital cases.
In other words, the hardest and most
discretionary sentencing decisions are
made by ad-hoc panels of one-time lay
decision makers - hardly a process
calculated to minimize arbitrariness and
discrimination. And yet we believe that
jury sentencing plays an important rule
in legitimating the death penalty, and
ensuring that its use reflects community
values.17
The sum of the effects of these forces
is a depressing fact: Consistency in
criminal sentencing is least likely in
decisions on life and death, where it
matters most. Not surprisingly, there is
a great deal of evidence that race and
chance both play large roles in determining who is sentenced to death in the
United States, and who is spared.18
Consider two stylized capital punishment systems. System I: We grab every
person who commits a murder and
quickly kill them. System II: We (equally
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See D.C. Baldus, G.G. Woodworth, and C.A.
Pulaski Jr., Equal justice and the Death Penalty,
(Northeastern University Press, 1990); S.R.
Gross and R. Mauro, Death and Discrimination:

efficiently) grab every person who
commits a murder and put them into a
holding pen. After five years, we empty
out the pen and decide which of the
inmates to kill. System I has a harsh, Old
Testament quality, but if you want
revenge, it might seem right. The execution is a direct response to the murder.
System II, however, is a closer approximation of what we actually do, and must
do; but in this version the task is very
different. It's not just the wait, it's the
process of choosing who will die and who
will live: Death is now served by a
repetitive, comparative, untrustworthy,
selection procedure.
Judges and legislators are aware of this
arbitrariness and potential discrimination. They have tried to curb these
problems by creating an array of elaborate procedural devices such as trial-like
capital penalty hearings and post-verdict
"proportionality review" of death sentences. These procedures may or may not
have any effect - they certainly are not
entirely successful - but they do take
time. Moreover, the knowledge that
death row prisoners may have been
unfairly or arbitrarily singled out makes
judges move more carefully and less
expeditiously on all other procedural
points as well.
Perhaps executions could be speeded
up somewhat. I can imagine that we
could contrive to conduct most of them
within five years of arrest, rather than
ten. We can't go much faster than that
without dismantling the procedural
structure of our system of criminal justice
- a structure that was created largely to
protect defendants. This cuts strongly
against the grain; it will not happen.
Given that limitation, there is little
incentive to accelerate the process at all,
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AWIDHY AVAllAHlE DEATH PENAlTY THAT IS RARHY CARRIED OUT.
since even a five-year delay is enough to
gut the meaning of revenge. The man
you wanted to kill was the abusive
robber, high on crack, who pistol
whipped and shot two customers at a
Seven-Eleven store in 1984. Instead, in
1990, the state electrocutes a balding,
religious model prisoner in a neat blue
denim uniform.
The processes I have described feed
on themselves, and on each other. To
reduce errors in capital cases we generate
new procedures; these procedures must
be followed in future cases, which
increases delay. As executions are
delayed, they are increasingly drained of
content as acts of revenge; as a result, it
is increasingly easy to accept further
delays, or to forego the killings altogether. As delays and reversals become
more common, executions become
increasingly rare; the more rare they are,
the more likely it is that those who are
killed will be the victims of bias or
caprice - and the more distasteful the
task of singling out and killing the few
who will die . Rising concerns about
discrimination and arbitrariness - and
growing uneasiness with the whole
process - in tum, generate new doubts,
new procedures, and new delays.

MORE OF THE SAME
At a glance, the death rows of America
seem headed for a massacre. As of April
1993, there were 2,729 prisoners on death
rows in the United States, and·about 250
new death sentences are meted out each
year.19 Public support for the death penalty
is intense, politicians fan the heat, and
condemned prisoners pile up like dry
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Ellsworth &: Ross, 29 Crime and Delinquency at
151-52, (cited in note 11) (50 percent of sample
agreed that "Even when a murderer gets a life
sentence, he usually gets out on parole, so it is
better to execute him," and 65% agreed that "One
advantage of the death penalty is that it makes it
impossible for convicted murderers to later go
free on account of some legal technicality.")

brush. When Robert Alton Harris was put
to death in April 1992, some observers
speculated that the first execution in
California in a quarter of a century would
be the spark
·This was hardly the first time that
massive executions have been predicted.
It hasn't happened. I do not think it will
happen now either, although the rate of
executions is likely to move up a notch
from twenty or thirty a year to forty or
conceivably fifty. That would be a change,
but only in degree, not in kind. Even at
fifty a year, executions would still the
exception rather than the rule after a death
sentence - and they would still be slow,
costly and unpredictable.
My basic argument why little is likely to
change has two parts.
First, support for the death penalty does
not necessarily mean support for executions. Public attitudes on criminal sentencing are notoriously inconsistent. Several
researchers have asked people about their
attitudes toward perceived and actµal
sentences. The results show basic inconsistencies between what we say we want, and
what we ourselves would actually do. In
the context of the death penalty, many say
they are for "mandatory" death sentences
for certain crimes - killing a police
officer, for example, or homicide in the
course of a rape - but when given an
actual sentencing decision, choose life
imprisonment as the correct penalty in just
such a case. 20 Hugo Bedau has argued that
many of those who say they favor capital
punishment may want "only the legal threat
of the death penalty, coupled with the
judicial ritual of trying, convicting, and
occasionally sentencing a murderer to
death, rather than actual executions." 21
Some people, I expect, support capital
punishment in order to keep every possible

weapon in the public arsenal; others favor
the death penalty (with or without executions) simply because they do not believe
that life imprisonment lasts for life.22
Second, and more important, even those
who do want executions do not want
many. Many Americans, perhaps a
majority, want some executions to take
place as public statements about crime and
murder, but there is widespread aversion
to the prospect of numerous executions.
A single execution is not truly an act of
revenge but it looks like one; it symbolizes
our desire and our willingness to seek
vengeance. When we single out one
murderer we can focus on what he did to
deserve death. But if we were to conduct a
hundred executions in close order, we
would lose any illusion of individual
vengeance; all we would see is mass
slaughter by the state. The symbolism
would change; the issue would now be the
nature of our society, our culture. At a
minimum, it would be a humiliating
comment on our failure to control violence
by less bloody means; at worst it would
provoke repulsive comparisons with Hitler
and Stalin.
In short, appearances to the contrary
notwithstanding, the death penalty we
have is pretty much the death penalty we
want. The costs of the process are mostly
hidden from view. Politicians and judges
grumble about the delays, but the system
does produce what the public demands: a
widely available death penalty that is rarely
carried out.
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